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Environmental Law: Public Participation in the
Environmental Impact Statement Process
Consumers Power Company applied to the Atomic Energy
Commission' (Commission) for permission to construct two nuclear powered reactors in Midland, Michigan. 2 At a public hearing conducted by an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 3 (Licensing Board), individual residents of the neighboring community of Mapleton and several local citizen groups petitioned
for and were granted permission to intervene in the reactor proceedings. The intervenors argued that the environmental impact
statement (EIS) for construction of the reactors did not adequately consider "alternatives to the proposed action" as required
by sections 102 (C) (iii) and 102(D) of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).4 In particular, they contended that
the EIS was fatally defective because it failed to examine energy
conservation as an alternative to plant construction. 5

Despite these objections, the Licensing Board authorized issuance of an operating license.- The Board's decision not to con1. On October 11, 1974, Congress passed the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
5801-5891 (Supp. V 1975)). This legislation abolished the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and established in its place two agencies, the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
ERDA took responsibility for
conducting research and developing all energy resources, including nuclear energy, and the NRC assumed the licensing and regulatory functions formerly conducted by the AEC. AEC regulations affecting the
licensing process for nuclear reactors were unaffected by this legislation.
For purposes of this comment, both the AEC and the NRC are referred
to as the Commission, or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
2. As required by the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2039,
2232(b) (1970), the application was referred first to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and the AEC staff. In 1970, both

ACRS and the staff gave preliminary approval to the proposed project.

Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, No. 73-1776, slip op. at 3
(D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976).
3. For a discussion of the composition of the Licensing Board, the
procedure it follows, and its relationship to the NRC see note 33 infra.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(C) (iii), (D) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
4332 (C) (iii), (E) (Supp. V, 1975).
5. Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, No. 73-1776, slip op.
at 5 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976).
6. In its decision, the Board stated that energy conservation alternatives were beyond its province to discuss and indicated that the real
question was which power generating technology would be superior.
Id. at 6.
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sider conservation alternatives was affirmed on administrative
appeal before the full Commission. 7 The Commission held that
before licensing boards need explore energy conservation alternatives, intervenors
must state clear and reasonably specific energy conservation
contentions in a timely fashion. Beyond that, they have a burden of coming forward with some affirmative showing if they
novel contentions explored further.8

wish to have ...

The Commission elaborated on the "affirmative showing" requirement by establishing a "threshold test"9 under which intervenors had to demonstrate the reasonableness of an alternative
before the Commission would be required to consider it. In the
case of the Midland reactors, the Commission found that the intervenors' comments on energy conservation "fell far short" of
this standard. 10
Having exhausted all administrative remedies, intervenors
petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia." There, petitioners argued that the
"'threshold

test'

.

. [was]

inconsistent

with NEPA's 'basic

mandate' to the Commission to 'take the initiative' in considering
environmental issues.' 1 2 In deciding that the Commission had
erred in promulgating the "threshold test", the court of appeals
substituted its own standard, holding that an intervenor's comments on a draft EIS which raised a "colorable alternative" not
considered in the draft must only bring "sufficient attention to
7. The appeal procedure within the NRC is outlined in note 33
infra.
8. Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, No. 73-1776, slip op.
at 9 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976) (quoting In re Consumers Power Co., 7
A.E.C. 19, 32 (1974)).
9. Purported energy conservation issues must meet a threshold
test-they must relate to some action, methods or developments
that would, in their aggregate effect, curtail demand for electricity to a level at which the proposed facility would not be needed.
•...
Beyond that the issue must pertain to an alternative that
is "reasonably available." NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834
(C.A.D.C. 1972). (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the impact
of proposed energy conservation alternatives on demand must
be susceptible to a reasonable degree of proof. Largely speculative and remote possibilities need not be weighed against a convincing project of demand.
Id. at 9 (quoting In re Consumers Power Co., 7 A.E.C. at 24).
10. Id. (quoting In re Consumers Power Co., 7 A.E.C. at 32).
11. See note 33 infra for a discussion of the review procedure. Petitioner can seek review of NRC action either in the Circuit Court of
Appeals where he resides or in Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.
12. Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, No. 73-1776, slip op.
at 11 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976) (citing Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm'n, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
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the issue to stimulate the Commission's consideration of it."'3
Once this sufficient stimulus was provided, "'it [was] incumbent
on the Commission to undertake its own preliminary investigation of the ... alternative sufficient to reach a rational judgment
whether it is worthy of detailed consideration in the EIS.' ",14 If
the Commission decided that further consideration of a suggested
alternative was unwarranted, it was obligated, under the court's
ruling, to explain the basis for its conclusion. Finding that the
intervenors' comments had been adequate to "'stimulate the
Commission's consideration' of energy conservation alternatives,"'15 the court remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings. Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, No. 73-1776 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976), cert. granted sub nom.
Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman, 45 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S.,
Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-528).
NEPA has been described as being "[a] t the very least ...
an environmental full disclosure law."' 6 The primary vehicle for
this disclosure is the impact statement required under section
102 of the Act, 1 7 which must be prepared before federal agencies' 8 reach any final decision on a proposed "major" action that
may "significantly" -affect the environment. 19 The statement
evaluates this action in terms of its environmental impact, unavoidable adverse environmental effects, alternatives available,
short term uses of the environment versus long term productiv20
ity, and irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources.
The impact statement serves the two related goals of informed decisionmaking and public accountability. The impact
statement is aimed partly at ensuring that the responsible agency
decision-maker has before him-and presumably will take into
account-all possible environmental consequences of a proposed
project. 2' It is also expected to contribute to informed extra13. Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, No. 73-1776, slip.
op. at 13 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976).
14. Id. (quoting Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. FPC, 502 F.2d 336, 339
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975)).
15. Id. at 14 (quoting Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. FPC, 502 F.2d
336, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975)).
16. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F.
Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
17. - 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V 1975).
18. The Environmental Protection Agency is excluded from the EIS
requirements of NEPA. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d
375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (i)-(v) (Supp. V 1975).
20. Id.
21. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 810
(E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). As another court put
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agency review of agency decisions by enabling "those removed
from the decision-making process to evaluate and balance the factors on their own."'22 To achieve this goal of public accountability, the Act requires that the environmental impact studies be
"placed before the President, the Congress, and the people, for
public decision. ' 23
NEPA' s inclusion of environmental considerations in the decisionmaking process forces agencies to employ a "systematic, interdisciplinary approach. ' 24 At a minimum, they must look beyond a narrow cost-benefit analysis and consider factors "incapable of quantification in terms of aesthetic, cultural, social or
perhaps even psychological values ' 25 in deciding whether to pursue a given proposal.
Although a strict reading of NEPA might restrict the EIS
commenting process to a solicitation of the views of other
government bodies, the Act has not been read so narrowly.
Both Executive Order 1151426 and the Council on Environmental
Quality's (CEQ's) Guidelines for implementing the impact statement requirement 27 suggest, instead, a policy favoring broad public involvement in the EIS procedure. Similarly, the courts have
generally held that federal agencies are obliged both to seek comments from the public and to consider these comments in devel28
oping a final impact statement.
it, "The record should be complete. Then, if the decisionmakers choose
to ignore [environmental] factors, they will be doing so with their eyes
wide open." Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs,
325 F. Supp. 744, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971).

22. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc, v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 810
(E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
23. JOINT HOUSE-SENATE COLLOQUIUM TO DisCUSS A NATIONAL POLICY
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR

AND INSULAR AFFAIRS AND HousE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND AsTRONAuTIcs,
90TH CONG., 2D SESS. 104 (1968) (Comm. Print 1968) (prepared by Prof.

Lynton K. Caldwell), reprinted in 115 Cong. Rec. 29071 (1969) (emphasis
added).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (Supp. V 1975).
25. Note, Threshold Determinations Under Section 102(C) (2) of
NEPA: The Case for "Reasonableness" as a Standard for Judicial Review, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 107, 128 n.114 (1974).

26. Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality, Exec.
Order No. 11514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1966-1970 compilation), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 app. at 10658-59 (1970).

27. Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements; Guidelines,
40 C.F.R. 1500.2(b) (1976). These Guidelines specify that the public
must be given an opportunity to comment on draft impact statements
and that the final EIS must be "responsive to the comments received."
Id.
28. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton, 2 ENvIR'L L. REP. 20,287, 20,295
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There are a number of advantages to be derived from
public participation in administrative hearings. According to one
commentator,
Public intervention can provide agencies with another dimension
useful in assuring responsive and responsible decisions; it can
serve as a safety valve allowing interested persons and groups
to express their views before policies are announced and implemented; it can ease the enforcement of administrative programs
relying upon public cooperation; and it can satisfy judicial demands that agencies observe the highest procedural standards.

If agency hearings were to become readily available to public
participation, confidence in the performance of government instiof administrative hearings might be
tutions and in the fairness
29
measurably enhanced.

A further reason for requiring agencies to consider the views
of members of the public as well as those of "experts," is that
some of the issues confronting agency decisionmakers are simply
beyond the scope of technical expertise.
In the case of a proposed nuclear facility, for example, the
decision whether to proceed with construction depends essentially upon striking a balance between the need for power and
the imposition of environmental, health, and safety risks on society. This question is resolved ultimately by a subjective determination reflecting basic societal values, morals, and beliefs and
not by establishing any objective, scientific truth. While a general public determination that nuclear power is socially acceptable is arguably implicit in congressional authorization of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's)

30

activities, 3 1 NEPA

(D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he public has a

right to participate in drafting the final environmental impact statement
by submitting comments and environmental information upon any alleged
legal or factual matter in the draft impact statement."); Lathan v. Volpe,
350 F. Supp. 262, 265 (W.D. Wash. 1972) (public involvement was essential to the adequacy of an EIS); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D.
Wash.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1972) (NEPA's procedures had
otherwise failed to provide an opportunity for public comment on the
impact statements which had been prepared); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F.
252 (W.D. Wash. 1972) (same). In Lathan, the court went so far as to
suggest that "relevant and reasonable" doubts raised by public comment
might have to be resolved by research before the final impact statement
would be adequate. 350 F. Supp. at 265. In this respect, Lathan foreshadowed Aeschliman.
29. Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative Proceedings,81
YALE L.J. 359, 361 (1972). See also Cramton, The Why, Where and How
of Broadened Public Participationin the Administrative Process, 60 GEo.
L.J. 525, 535-36 (1972).
30. See note 1 supra, for a discussion of the 1974 reorganization of
the AEC.
31. See note 77 infra.
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still requires agency consideration of public comments whenever
a major action significantly affecting the environment is contemplated. 2 If the public's views are to be accurately reflected in
an individual licensing decision, there is no substitute for direct
public participation to determine whether the community is willing to accept the potential risks.
Despite the NEPA requirement that the public participate
directly in the formulation of agency decisions affecting the environment, the public's ability to influence an agency's final decision is rather limited. Nowhere is this limitation more appar33
ent than in the case of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970).
33. To appreciate the difficulty of effective public participation in
the nuclear licensing process, it is first necessary to understand the process itself. The licensing procedure commences with the filing of an application. 10 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1976). NRC regulations require that an applicant obtain both a construction permit to build the facility and an
operating license upon its completion. 10 C.F.R. § 50.10 (a) - (b) (1976).
In connection with the construction permit application, the applicant
must file a preliminary safety report for review by the Commission staff.
10 C.F.R. § '50.34 (1976). When the staff's review is complete, the application is reviewed by the independent statutory Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards which issues a final report to the full Commission
expressing its opinion as to whether the proposed facility can be constructed with reasonable assurance that it will operate without undue
risk to public health and safety. 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1970).
Prior to issuance of a construction permit or an operating license,
the applicant is also required to submit an Environmental Report which
includes the same kinds of considerations set forth in section 102(C) of
NEPA. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.30(f), 51.20 (1976). The Commission staff
considers this report in preparing its own draft environmental impact
statement. The draft EIS is then circulated for public comment. After
reviewing comments received from various federal, state, and local agencies and officials, from the applicant, and from private organizations and
individuals, the Commission staff prepares a final impact statement. This
final EIS is sent to the Council on Environmental Quality and is made
available for public scrutiny. Subsequent hearings and actions on environmental matters involved in the Commission's issuance of a construction permit or operating license are based on the Commission's final EIS.
10 C.F.R. §§'51.22-.26 (1976).
Under the Atomic Energy Act, public hearings are necessary in conjunction with the construction permit application but are required at the
operating license stage only upon the filing of a public request for a hearing accompanied by a petition to intervene. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1970).
The public hearing is an adjudicatory proceeding conducted by a Licensing Board. Each Board is composed of three members selected from a
panel appointed by the Commission from the private sector, the Commission staff, and other administrative agencies. 10 C.F.R. § 2.721 (1976).
The parties to the hearing include the applicant, the Commission staff,
and any intervenors. Any of these parties may submit evidence to the
Board on those issues the Board is required to consider and on those
issues in controversy among the parties. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.35(a), 50.57
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The public's efforts to ensure consideration of its views by the
Commission are hampered by several features of the licensing
process. First, a general agency bias favoring the promotion of
nuclear power pervades agency proceedings. Under NRC regulations, the three member Licensing Board appointed to evaluate
each proposed facility must include at least two persons with
expertise in either nuclear technology or a field related to issues
raised in the proceeding. 3 4 While some nuclear expertise is essential for Board members to successfully resolve the complex
technical problems associated with atomic energy licensing, the
effect of this regulation has been to fill Board positions with
Commission employees or scientists who have been supported by
Commission research grants, both of whom have an interest in
nuclear promotion.3 5 As a result of this pro-nuclear bias, Board
members tend to approach licensing proceedings with a predisposition to grant the license requested.3 6
(1976) for a description of the issues to be considered in contested permit
and licensing proceedings, respectively. After considering all the evidence, the Board either grants or denies the license. 10 C.F.R. 2.760
(1976). A party to the proceeding, however, may appeal the Licensing
Board's decision by filing exceptions with the Commission. If exceptions
are filed, the Commission appoints an Appeal Board to review the prior
Licensing Board decision. 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.762, 2.785-87 (1976). The Appeal Board is chosen from a panel in a manner similar to the selection
of Licensing Board members and is generally free to consider the entire
record on review, though its inquiry may be limited to matters to which
exceptions have been filed. 10 C.F.R. § 2.770 (1976). A determination
by the Appeal Board is subject to further agency review by certification
to the Commission. 10 C.F.R. § 2.786 (1976). Finally, judicial review
of final agency action is available in the United States Courts of Appeals.
28 U.S.C. § 2342(4) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1970). Venue is in the
Circuit Court of Appeals where the petitioner resides or in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 28 U.S.C. § 2343 (1970).
34. 10 C.F.R. § 2.721(a) (1976).
35. See Ellis & Johnston, Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants by the
Atomic Energy Commission, 13 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 101, 127 (1971). But
see S. EBBIN & R. KASPER, CITIzEN GRouPs AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY:
USES OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION 177
(1974), in which the authors note that recent appointments to the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board Panel have included experts in the environmental sciences as well as hearing board chairmen with few ties to the
AEC or the NRC.
The general pro-nuclear bias of Board members has been summarized as follows by one of the Midland intervenors:
Board members have a long and successful relationship with the
development of nuclear power; and inherent (almost genetic)
feeling that a loss of coolant accident will never happen; and
that any safety or environmental problem raised during the
course of licensing hearings can be resolved at some point before
it is too late.
Id. at 82.
36. Ebbin and Kasper have documented this bias through inter-
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In addition to the bias of Licensing Board members, the Commission staff generally acts more as the applicant's ally than as
an independent fact finder. By the time a case is set for public
hearing, the Commission staff has met with the applicant and
resolved to the Commission's satisfaction potential barriers to issuance of the license. At the hearing the staff typically helps
the applicant to establish that the proposed facility poses no
safety hazard. s 7 While NRC regulations require the applicant
to demonstrate that a license should be granted, 38 the staff's advocacy effectively shifts the burden of proof from the applicant
to the intervenors who must show good cause for its denial. 39
Given the bias of both the Commission staff and the Licensing
Board, public intervenors seeking to influence an agency decision
face formidable opposition.
The carefully restricted scope of the hearings authorized by
NRC regulations also makes effective public participation difficult. While NRC rules permit citizen participation, they confine
the scope of licensing hearings largely to technical aspects of reactor safety, 40 thus allowing for only minimal and often meaningless public participation, since technical matters of plant construction are generally beyond the public's competence to discuss.4 1 Opportunity to debate the broad social policy considerations underlying the use of nuclear power is limited basically
to that phase of the hearing process devoted to determining the
42
adequacy of the Commission's environmental impact statement,
and, even here, the question of energy alternatives may only
views with Licensing Board members as well as through observation of
nuclear proceedings. EBBIN &KASPER, supra note 35, at 178-79.
37. See generally id. at 235-36.
38. 10 C.F.R. § 2.732 (1976).
39. See Green, Safety Determinationsin Nuclear Power Licensing:
A CriticalView, 43 NOTRE DAME L. 633, 655-56 (1968).
40. As one commentator has observed: "[C]oncerned citizens have
been led, like lambs to the slaughter, into the promoters' arena to contest
a variety of valves, filters, cooling towers, and miscellaneous other items
of hardware in specific nuclear power plants." Remarks of Prof. John
Gofman, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION (Nov. 1972), reprinted in part in A.
REITZE, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING:

LAW OF LAND AND REsOURCEs

at 17-3

(1974).
41. A number of environmental interest groups have been able to
compensate'for their lack of technical expertise by employing counsel
with extensive experience in nuclear licensing cases. In the Midland
case, for example, one of the intervenors was represented by Myron
Cherry, a veteran in nuclear proceedings, who makes up for his lack of
scientific experience by being accompanied at agency hearings by scientific experts. See EBBIn & KASPER, supra note 35, at 169.
42. See 10 C.F.R. § 51.52 (1976).
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be raised if couched in terms of one of the specific environmental
43
requirements set forth in NEPA.
Possible citizen impact on agency decisions is also impeded
by the regulations limiting who may participate in those deliberations. Although the NRC tightened the requirements for public
intervention in 1972, 4 4 ostensibly to focus the hearings on matters
actually in controversy, 45 the amendments were apparently enacted in response to the efforts of some environmentalists to convert the licensing proceeding into a national forum 4 G for educat-

ing the public and its elected representatives about the risks of
nuclear energy. 47 Despite the new regulations, however, environmentalists are unlikely to be discouraged from future efforts to
use the licensing proceedings as a vehicle for generating public
awareness of the risks of nuclear power and ultimately for promoting a congressional reassessment of our nation's nuclear policy. 48

The hearings are thus a means of furthering the second

43. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
44. The new rules require any potential intervenor to establish his
qualifications by setting forth "with particularity both the facts pertaining to his interest and the basis for his contentions with regard to each
aspect on which he desires to intervene." 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1976).
These rules were published initially in 37 FED. REG. 15132 (July 28, 1972).
As one commentator observed,
Obtaining supporting evidence for the contentions contained in
the petition is difficult, since much of the necessary information
is in the possession of the applicant and the AEC staff. In addition, even in situations where the supporting documents are
made public, an intervenor often has insufficient time for a comprehensive evaluation prior to the Licensing Board's preliminary
determination of the issues in controversy at the first prehearing
conference.
Note, Increasing Citizen Participationin AEC Proceedings by Expanding Social Impact Considerations: The Maine Yankee Decision, 42 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1062, 1072 (1974).
45. Doub, "The Right to be Heard"--Laying It on the Line, 13 ATOM.
ENEGY L.J. 211, 216 (1971).

46. Ebbin and Kasper have identified three major purposes underlying citizen-group participation in nuclear regulatory proceedings: (1)
to ensure that the plant be made as safe as possible and that the detrimental effects of its operation be minimized; (2) to upgrade the public's
awareness as to the risks of nuclear power; and (3) to delay or stop
the construction and operation of a given nuclear facility. EBBiN & KAsPER, supra note 35, at 190.

47. See generally Like, Multi-Media Confrontation-The Environmentalists' Strategy for a "No-Win" Agency Proceeding, 13 AToM. ENERGY L.J. 1 (1971).

48. One commentator has expressed the goal of environmentalists
in the following terms:
[I]t is the duty of citizen intervenors to transform the agency
hearings into a dramatic medium, which by its content and
total effect will educate the public and its opinion and policy-
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of the NEPA goals-the promotion of informed extra-agency re49
view of.agency decisions.
While the public's impact on agency decision-making may be
hampered by some of these features of the licensing process, the
agency itself may be similarly hampered by certain aspects of
public participation. Environmentalists' attempts to expand the
hearing process from the consideration of a single license application into a general discussion of nuclear policy, for example, inevitably result in time-consuming delays in the hearing processprecisely what the agency wishes to avoid.50 Moreover, even
where deliberate delaying tactics are not employed, the EIS
process as outlined in section 102(C) 5 1 is cumbersome and
lengthy. Particularly time-consuming is NEPA's requirement that
agencies explore alternatives, given the wide range of potential
choices that exist for almost every project. While the Act has
been held to require only a "meaningful reference" to possible
adverse environmental impacts in the EIS,5 2 - the language
of section 102(E) orders agencies to "study, develop, and
describe appropriate alternatives,"5 3 and CEQ Guidelines direct
them to make a "rigorous exploration" of alternative actions that
"might avoid some or all of the adverse environmental effects." 54
makers to the possible environmental hazards, and compel their
commitment to and participation in political activity aimed at
ultimately winning the victory not attainable in the narrow confines of the agency proceeding.
Like, supra note 47, at 8-9. And Ebbin and Kasper conclude, based on
interviews with various environmental groups, that public education is a
major goal of virtually every group that intervenes in nuclear proceedings. EBBIN & KASPER, supra note 35, at 163.
49. One vehicle that intervenors have relied upon to generate public discussion of the social acceptability of nuclear power is the directive
provided in section 102(C) (iii) of NEPA that agencies must consider "alternatives to the proposed action." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (iii) (Supp. V
1975). As in Aeschliman, environmental groups have argued that this
section requires consideration of the alternative of not building the nuclear plant at all. See, e.g., Carolina Envir'l Study Group v. United
States, 510 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
50. The applicant too has a substantial interest in avoiding the costs
associated with prolonged agency proceedings. According to one trade
publication, licensing delays in the Midland case added over $430 million
to the cost of the Consumers Power project. EBBIN & KASPER, supra note
35, at 85.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (Supp. V 1975).
52. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d
783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(E) (Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. §
4332 (D) (1970).
54. CEQ Guidelines--Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment (April 23, 1971) in 0. GRAY, ENVIRONMNTAL
LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 13 (2d ed. 1973).
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The potential for delay and expense in the NEPA impact
statement requirements made it imperative to limit the scope of
the EIS, and particularly the alternatives to be considered, to
prevent NEPA from completely frustrating the agency decisional
process. 55 Beginning with Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Morton,56 courts recognized the costliness of the earlier
57
judicial emphasis on the most complete disclosure possible.
This awareness is reflected in limitations on both the range of
alternatives that must be discussed and the depth in which they
must be examined.
In Morton, the District of Columbia Circuit Court propounded a "rule of reason" which stated that only those alternatives reasonably available-that is, available in the same time
span as the original proposal-need be discussed at all. 58 Somewhat tautologically, the court indicated that the scope of the discussion of reasonable alternatives itself was subject to a limitation of reasonableness. Thus, NEPA did not require detailed discussion of the environmental effects of alternatives put forward
in comments when the effects "cannot be readily ascertained and
the alternatives are deemed only remote and speculative possibilities."5 9 Instead, the EIS only had to include those alternatives
"sufficient to permit a reasoned choice. ' 60 The Morton approach
of restricting the contents and scope of impact statements has
been followed in subsequent decisions. 6 1
55. Both the Senate and Conference Committee reports on NEPA
expected the impact statement process not to add measurably to the time
it takes to make a decision and to fit comfortably within the normal
decision-making procedure. COMMITTEE OF CONmERENCE, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969, H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91ST CONG., 1ST
SEss. 29 reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2767, 2769;

S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1969).
56. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.), dismissed as moot, 337 F. Supp. 170
(D.D.C. 1972). See also cases cited in note 61 infra.
57. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). In that case,
the court took note of the NEPA requirement that agencies must comply
with section 102 "to the fullest extent possible." 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp.
V 1975). The court interpreted this requirement to mean that section
102 duties must be met "unless there is a clear conflict of statutory authority." 449 F.2d at 1115. Furthermore, "[c]onsiderations of administrative difficulty, delay or economic cost [would] not suffice to strip
the section of its fundamental importance." Id.
58. 458 F.2d at 834.
59. Id. at 837-38.
60. Id. at 836.
61. See Carolina Envir'l Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796,
801 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (agencies need only consider "alternatives as they
exist and are likely to exist"); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d
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While Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 62 does
not directly contravene the limitations suggested by Morton and
its progeny, it does undercut these earlier decisions by expanding
the scope of the EIS inquiry. Aeschliman leaves untouched the
requirement that only "reasonable" alternatives need to be included in the final EIS, 63 but, if an intervenor provides "sufficient" stimulus regarding a proposed alternative when commenting on a draft EIS, the agency must develop that alternative to the
point at which a determination of its reasonableness can be
460, 471 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974) (only alternatives that are "reasonable or feasible" need be discussed).
62. The Aeschliman court mentions Morton only in passing and
gives no reason for the apparent departure from its emphasis in Morton
on restricting the scope of the impact statement. One explanation for
this seeming reversal in direction by the D.C. Circuit is that Aeschliman
was decided by a different three-judge panel than that which participated in the Morton decision. (Morton was decided by Judges Leventhal, Tamm, and McKinnon; Aeschliman by Judges Bazelon and Fahy
of the D.C. Circuit and Judge Justice, a U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
292(d)). Judge Bazelon's opinion in Aeschliman is consistent with his
emphasis in prior decisions on creating a full record as a check against
abuse of discretion by administrative agencies. See, e.g., his concurring
opinion in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652
(D.C. Cir. 1973):
[I]n cases of great technological complexity, the best way for
courts to guard against unreasonable or erroneous administrative
decisions is not for the judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each decision. Rather, it is to establish a decision-making process which assures a reasoned decision that can
be held up to the scrutiny of the scientific community and the
public ....
If we were to require procedures ... that open the
Administrator's decision to challenge and force him to respond,
we could rely on an informed [public] rather than on our own
groping in the dark to test the validity of that decision.
In International Harvester, Judge Bazelon, although coming to the
same conclusion as the majority, disagreed with the opinion written by
Judge Leventhal, the author of Morton. Id. at 650-52. Their disagreement in International Harvester, moreover, paralleled the difference in
perspective of the reviewing courts in Aeschliman and Morton.
See also Judge Bazelon's opinion in D.C. Fed'n of Civil Ass'ns v.
Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030
(1972) ("even though formal administrative findings are not required by
statute, the Secretary could best serve the interests of the parties as well
as the reviewing court by establishing a full-scale administrative record
which might dispel any doubts about the true basis of his action"), and
his statement in Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, No. 73-1776,
slip op. at 12 n.12 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976) ("The decision that a technological or other development is a 'realistic' alternative which merits full
consideration in an EIS ought not turn on the intuition of 'technically
illiterate' judges that it is 'reasonable.'").
63. No. 73-1776, slip op. at 12 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976).
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made. 64 This requirement will almost certainly result in additional expenditures of time, effort, and money by agencies seeking to comply with the Aeschliman mandate. If the decision
contributed significantly to either informed decision-making or
greater public accountability,6 5 some additional delay and expense in the EIS process might be tolerable. Aeschliman, however, does not appear to materially advance either of these goals.
Assuming an agency has complied in good faith with the
NEPA requirements, its impact statement should contain reference to "reasonable alternatives" in keeping with the Morton
"rule of reason" test. Failure to mention a given alternative suggests either that the agency considered the alternative and found
it unreasonable, in which case Aeschliman requires only a pro
forma explanation of the decision, or that the agency inadvertently overlooked the alternative. At first glance, Aeschliman
seems to advance the goal of informed decision-making by bringing the overlooked alternative to agency attention.
Underlying NEPA is an unstated premise that institutional
bias may prevent an agency from recognizing and considering
alternatives beyond the range of its expertise. 66 It is seemingly
to compensate for such agency bias that NEPA requires the solicitation of opinions from other agencies and members of the public
in preparing environmental impact statements.67 Aeschliman
fosters public'participation in NEPA proceedings by shifting the
costs of investigation to the agency, thus helping to remove the
economic barrier to public intervention by any but the most well64. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra for the test propounded by the court.
65. See text accompany notes 21-23 supra.
66. Thus, Senator Edmund S. Muskie, one of the chief sponsors of
NEPA, urged during floor debate that responsibility for enforcing the
Act not be left entirely to the agencies, and that a mechanism for interagency review of impact statements be implemented as a check on
agency bias. In support of his position, Muskie stated:
The concept of self-policing by Federal agencies which pollute or license pollution is contrary to the philosophy and intent
of existing environmental quality legislation. In hearing after
hearing agencies of the Federal Government have argued that
their primary authorization, whether it be maintenance of the
navigable waters by the Corps of Engineers or licensing of nuclear power-plants by the Atomic Energy Commission, takes
precedence over water quality requirements.
I repeat, these agencies have always emphasized their primary responsibility making environmental considerations secondary in their view.
115 CONG. REc. 29053 (1969).

67. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
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financed groups. 68 Increased public participation, in turn, increases the likelihood that alternatives not previously considered
by the agency will be brought to its attention.
The conclusion that Aeschliman fosters informed agency decisions, however, necessarily presupposes that an agency will adequately consider an alternative if it is brought to the agency's
attention, a result which is by no means certain. Indeed, the
institutional bias that initially caused the agency to overlook the
alternative is likely to prevent full appreciation of its merits once
it is suggested. Under AIeschliman, the burden of developing the
case for an alternative shifts from the intervenor to the agency.0
As noted above, 70 however, the NRC staff's role in licensing proceedings is essentially that of a proponent of the nuclear plant
in question. As an advocate of plant construction, the staff lacks
the incentive to diligently investigate or enthusiastically present
to the Commission an alternative that threatens plant completion. Even more determinative than agency bias is that the NRC
staff is unlikely, to possess adequate knowledge to fully investigate non-nuclear alternatives.
Those proposing an alternative have considerable interest in
seeing that it is thoroughly investigated, earnestly advocated, and
favorably considered, but Aeschliman does little to assist intervenors to develop a convincing case. Mere satisfaction of the
"sufficient" stimulus test bjr the intervenors is not likely to convince a skeptical agency of an alternative's merit; unless intervenors present more information than Aeschliman requires, they
are unlikely to persuade the agency, the courts, the Congress,
or the public of their alternative's value. While Aeschliman may
thus encourage public participation in agency proceedings by re68. According to EBBIN & KASPER, supra note 35, at 194, the cost
of intervention in NRC proceedings can run as high as $100,000. The
financial straits of many public intervenors dictate not only their initial
decision as to whether to participate in a proceeding but also subsequent
decisions concerning strategy and the possibility of judicial appeal.
69. No. 73-1776, slip op. at 12-13 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976). Intervenors are, of course, not precluded from independently developing their
alternative. The thrust of Aeschliman, however, is to encourage participation by those who, in the past, have been discouraged from participation because they lack the resources to develop their alternative to the
point where it satisfies the reasonableness standard of Morton. Aeschliman lowers the threshold barrier for these groups by only requiring them
to meet the "sufficient' stimulus test. Id. Nonetheless, their financial
situation is likely to make them dependent on the agency for development of their alternative.
70. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
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ducing its expense, the result will not necessarily be more informed decisions. Instead, to the extent that alternatives are left
to agency investigation, they are apt to receive only perfunctory
and cursory treatment rather than the careful analysis and aggressive advocacy essential to responsible decisionmaking.' 1
Aeschliman's contribution to the second of the major NEPA
objectives, that of public accountability, is similarly marginal. If
an agency's initial decision is unresponsive to public desires, ex72
ternal pressure may be exerted on it either by the courts

or by Congress. The court in Aeschliman appears to advocate
the judicial route, justifying its requirement that agencies explain their basis for concluding that no further consideration of
an alternative is warranted as facilitating judicial review. 7 3 Despite assertions that NEPA mandates judicial review of substantive agency decisions,' 4 however, courts generally have been un71. One means of promoting greater citizen involvement in agency
proceedings without sacrificing the traditional advocacy function performed by intervenors would be the enactment of legislation authorizing
reimbursement to intervenors for attorneys' fees and the costs of expert
witnesses. Along these lines, legislation was introduced in the 94th Congress providing for awards of "reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses" for public participation before federal agencies. S. 2715, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Ebbin and Kasper argue that such a system
should be funded by imposing a fee on applicants for a nuclear permit
or license. EBBIN & KASPER, supra note 35, at 284.
According to Gellhorn, supra note 29, other possibilities for facilitating public participation in agency proceedings include:
1) encouragement of pro bono publico work by the bar in this field;
2) appointment by each agency of a special counsel to represent
the interests of public participants in its proceedings;
3) development of a legal services program to provide legal assistance to groups affected by agency proceedings;
4) establishment of a permanent independent government advocate
(a separate agency) charged with representing the views of the public
before all federal agencies.
For a discussion of the pros and cons of each of these alternatives,
see id. at 394-98.
72. Congressman Diggs, the House sponsor of NEPA, emphasized
the utility of the EIS process as a means of access to the courts. "The
success of the environmental impact statements is not so much that they
were used as we intended they should, but that citizens have been able
to use the process as a [way] to get into court . . . ." Calm, Can Federal
Law Help Citizens Save Nature's Fragile Beauty?, Christian Science
Monitor, Feb. 28, 1973, at 12, col. 1.
73. Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, No. 73-1776, slip op.
at 13 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976).
74. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs,
470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) ("courts
have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits"); cf. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (court noted in dictum that the NEPA "creates judi-
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willing to inquire into the merits of a decision, absent a clear
abuse of discretion. 75 Agencies are virtually free to disregard
environmental considerations, provided they comply with the
procedural formalities of NEPA. In other words, they must prepare an impact statement, solicit outside comments, and fulfill
the rest of the impact-reporting requirements set forth in NEPA,
but the final balance between the environmental costs of a project and its economic or technological benefits is committed to
agency discretion.7 6 Judicial reluctance to engage in substantive
review of agency decisions makes this route an unlikely means
of achieving public accountability.
Absent judicial willingness or ability to achieve NEPA's goal
of public accountability, the responsibility appears to rest with
Congress, 7 7 which, to date, has shown no proclivity to intervene
in the nuclear power controversy.7 8 To the extent that this lack
cially enforceable duties," but went on to indicate that "[tihe reviewing
courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on its merits ...
unless it [is] shown that the actual balance of costs and benefits that
was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values").
75. Indeed, it appears that each time a court has purported to review an agency's decision on the merits, it has permitted the agency action to continue. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 953
(7th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470
F.2d 289, 301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Environ-

mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1014 (E.D. Tenn.
1973), aff'd on other grounds,492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); Environmental

Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231, 244-46 (W.D. Mo. 1973),

aff'd sub nom. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Calloway, 497 F.2d
1340 (8th Cir. 1974); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404,
414 (W.D. Va.), aff'd, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973).
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)
(1970), the reviewing court will set aside agency actions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with law. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971).
76. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engrs., 348 F.
Supp. 916, 928 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974).
77. It has been argued that Congress implicitly left the authority to
balance the potential benefits and risks of nuclear power to the Commission by its enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§
2011-2014 (1970), which established the foundation for the development
of atomic energy in this country. See, e.g., Rolnick, supra note 44, at
1074. Environmentalists counter that the general policy statements and
vague goals enunciated in the opening sections of the Atomic Energy Act
cannot reasonably constitute an indication of congressional intent to abdicate responsibility for determining our nuclear policy. See, e.g., Muchnicki, The Proper Role of the Public in Nuclear Power Plant Licensing
Decisions, 15 ATomvc EmNmy L.J. 34, 43 (1973).
78. See S. REP. No. 93-980, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 109(a) in which
the Senate Committee on Governmental Operations found and declared
in reporting the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974:
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of congressional action represents an affirmative determination
that our present nuclear policy should continue, the NEPA goal
of public accountability appears satisfied. It is arguable, however, that Congress has not acted because it is unaware of the
public's views on nuclear power and thus unable to translate
those views into law. To remedy this communication problem,
environmentalists seek to use agency proceedings to elevate public awareness of the risks of nuclear power and bring public pressure to bear on the Congress.
If Aeschliman fosters use of the impact statement to generate
public discussion, it might be seen as contributing to public accountability. Under CEQ Guidelines the agency's position is
already evident from the record, since agencies must include in
the final impact statement all public comments received,70 and
an agency's decision not to adopt an alternative suggested in a
public comment necessarily indicates rejection of that alternative. Requiring an agency to make explicit the rationale underlying its rejection of an alternative, which Aeschliman mandates,
potentially increases both the visibility of the agency's position
and its vulnerability to public scrutiny8 0 and, in this way, provides environmentalists with a means of stimulating the public
debate and controversy considered essential to public account-

ability.
Aeschliman's contribution to increased public awareness of
nuclear power issues is limited, however, because agency proceedings are particularly poor forums for public education. 8 1 NRC
hearings are sparsely attended by the public8 2 and only sporad[T]here is no comprehensive, coherent energy policy. Instead,
Federal activities consist of a myriad of laws, regulations and
inactions, that often result in narrow, short-range and conflicting
decisionmaking by individual agencies and the absence of an energy policymaking mechanism....
Id. at 41-42, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 5470, 5505.
79. Council on Environmental Quality Revised Guidelines on Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 40 C.F.RI § 1500.10 (1976):
"All substantive comments received on the draft ... should be attached
to the final statement, whether or not each such comment is thought to
merit individual discussion by the agency in the text of the statement."
80. If a congressional response was the goal of intervenors in
Aeschliman, they appear to have met with initial success. On August
27, 1976, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy scheduled a hearing for
the purpose of questioning NRC Chairman Marcus Rowden about the
Aeschliman decision and a related decision, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, No. 74-1586 (D.C. Cir. July
21, 1976).

112 CONG. REc. D 1160 (Aug. 27, 1976).

81. See generally EBBIN & KASPER, supra note 35, at 192.
82. Those few individuals who do attend contested hearings are
usually allied with one of the parties and generally are less interested
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ically reported by the news media. Even less attention is paid
to the bulky transcripts prepared from the hearings. No matter
how explicit the agency's position is made in the hearing record,
little public education is likely to occur in the average case.
In fact, Aeschliman might even detract from effective external review of agency decisions. The sheer volume of documents
and materials that comprise agency environmental impact statements itself deters public scrutiny. By adding to the size of the
agency record, Aeschliman makes it more difficult for the courts,
the Congress, and the public to evaluate the agency's position.
Likewise, by establishing another procedural requirement with
which agencies must comply, Aeschliman increases the likelihood
that those engaging in extra-agency review will mistake procedural compliance with NEPA for substantive compliance with the
Act. Lacking the expertise to analyze an agency decision in detail, the public, the courts, and the Congress are forced to rely
partially on the appearance of a good faith effort in determining
the adequacy of an agency's environmental investigation. To the
extent that form is mistaken for substance, compliance with the
Aeschliman disclosure requirement may lull the public and its
governmental representatives into foregoing an independent inquiry into the validity of an agency's actions.
Finally, Aeschliman is likely to add to the expense already
associated with the EIS process. This possibility is somewhat
mitigated by the court's statement that a preliminary investigation, if required, need not be detailed. 83 Furthermore, as the
court notes, if an agency has passed on the merits of an alter-.
native in a conscientious manner, the requirement that it explain
its position should not prove "onerous," nor, presumably, need
it be particularly time-consuming.8 4 The "cost" of Aeschliman
is, nonetheless, likely to be increased expense and delay in project
implementation. 5
Applying a balancing process, this "cost" might be tolerable
when the environmental stakes are especially high. In these situations, public participation in and accountability for decisions
in being educated than in seeing their preconceived ideas about the case
vindicated. Id.
83. Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, No. 73-1776, slip op.
at 13 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976).
84. Id. at 13-14.
85. In addition, the ambiguity inherent in the court's requirement
of "sufficient" stimulus invites additional litigation. This too is likely
to be a "cost" of Aeschliman.
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made are particularly important. Even the small contributions
made by Aeschliman toward achieving these objectives can accordingly be viewed as worthwhile. But cases involving significant environmental stakes generally attract well-financed public
interest groups that can afford to hire technical consultants to
develop the arguments for an energy alternative. They can thus
compel agency consideration of their proposals by satisfying the
"reasonableness" test8 6 articulated in -Morton and will benefit
8 7
little from Aeschliman's more attenuated "sufficiency" test.
In the majority of cases, whatever small benefits might accrue from Aeschliman are likely to be outweighed by their costs.
For this reason, courts should interpret the decision restrictively
in order to limit the situations in which an agency will be required to undertake an investigation of an energy alternative.
This can be accomplished by varying the intervenor's burden of
demonstrating the need for agency investigation according to the
magnitude of the project and the likelihood of the environmental
harm. The amount of information required to satisfy the sufficient stimulus test should be inversely related to the likelihood
and magnitude of the potential environmental harm. In the case
of a nuclear facility, for example, the potential environmental
risk is substantial. Relatively little information about an alternative should therefore have to be presented before a court requires further agency study.88 Projects posing a less serious environmental threat would demand an increase in the intervenor's
burden of proof. s 9 This approach to Aeschliman leaves the
courts with discretion to confine the agency burden imposed by
the decision to situations of relatively important environmental
stakes. Unless Aeschliman is confined in this manner, its major
contribution to the NEPA process is likely to be increased expense and delay, features which are already too prominent in
the area of environmental regulation.
86. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 13-15 & 62-64 supra.
88. A narrow reading of Aeschliman might limit its applicability
exclusively to cases involving the NRC and, hence, to cases involving
significant environmental risks. Environmentalists, however, are unlikely to perceive the case in such narrow terms.
89. Courts might choose, alternatively, to focus on the magnitude
of the suggested alternative in determining how much information would
be "sufficient" to justify an agency response. Applying this approach,
even in cases where a project's overall environmental impact appeared
relatively insignificant, only slight stimulus would be required to prompt
exploration if the proposed alternative appeared likely to significantly
reduce that impact.

